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Abstract
Security questions are one of the techniques used to recover passwords. The main limitation of security
questions is that users find strong answers difficult to remember. This leads users to trade-off security
for the convenience of an improved memorability. Previous research found that increased fun and
enjoyment can lead to an enhanced memorability, which provides a better learning experience. Hence,
we empirically investigate whether a serious game has the potential of improving the memorability of
strong answers to security questions. For our serious game, we adapted the popular “4 Pics 1 word”
mobile game because of its use of pictures and cues, which psychology research found to be important
to help with memorability. Our findings indicate that the proposed serious game could potentially
improve the memorability of answers to security questions. This potential improvement in
memorability, could eventually help reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back
authentication.
Keywords Usable Security, Fall-back Authentication, Security Questions, Serious Games,
Memorability
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1 Introduction
As internet users have to deal with an increasing number of online accounts, they are facing an
enormous challenge to remember all passwords chosen for their accounts (Stavova et al. 2016). For
example, if we just look at social networking sites, plenty of users have different accounts for Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram and SnapChat. Since password managers have not been widely adopted (Alkaldi and
Renauld 2016), resetting passwords is becoming a more frequent task (Florencio and Herley 2007;
Stavova et al. 2016). To address this problem, various forms of fall-back authentication mechanisms
have been deployed and evaluated with the most popular being security questions (Schechter and
Reeder 2009) and email-based password recovery. Although email-based password recovery has been
widely adopted by major companies (e.g. Google), they still have the limitation of being vulnerable to
‘man in the middle’ attacks, since these emails are not usually encrypted (Stavova et al. 2016).
Even security questions have several vulnerabilities. For instance, some answers to security questions
can be easily accessible with a quick Google search (e.g. in Sarah Palin's 2008 email hack (Bridis 2008),
the hacker merely used social engineering techniques to reset Palin's password using her birth-date, ZIP
code and where she met her spouse). Also, since 2008, more of our personal information has become
available online. Hence, it is becoming easier for attackers to retrieve this information (Golla and
Dürmuth 2015), through observational attacks (i.e. the art of human hacking used to obtain sensitive
information such as usernames, passwords, personal identification numbers through observing how
victims behave both online and off-line), from social networking websites, such as LinkedIn or Facebook
(Rabkin 2008). Besides observational attacks, security questions are also vulnerable to guessing attacks
(Golla and Dürmuth 2015), in which, attackers try to access accounts by providing low entropy (i.e. the
level of complexity) answers (e.g. favourite colour: blue). Thus, the ease of conducting observational and
guessing attacks has increased the vulnerabilities of security questions (Just and Aspinall 2010) towards
all these cyber-threats, which lead to severe consequences, such as monetary loss and embarrassment
(Micallef and Just 2011).
A possible way to reduce the vulnerability of security questions towards cyber-attacks is to use systemgenerated answers (Micallef and Just 2011). However, the main barrier towards widespread adoption
of these techniques is memorability (Just and Aspinall 2009), since users struggle to remember systemgenerated information to answer their security questions (Bonneau et al. 2015). Hence, the main
challenge of the current implementation of security questions is that strong answers to security
questions (i.e. high entropy), like those provided by system-generated answers (Micallef and Just 2011),
are less prone to observational and guessing attacks, but at the same time are difficult for the user to
remember the answers (Shay et al. 2012). Alternatively, weak answers to security questions (i.e. low
entropy) are more prone to cyber-attacks (Bonneau et al. 2010; Denning et al. 2011), nevertheless they
are easy for the user to remember the answers (Zviran and Haga 1990).
Since system-generated answers to security questions can limit the vulnerabilities to guessing and social
engineering attacks (Shay et al. 2012), they seem to be the most promising solution to bridge the tradeoff between usability and security in fall-back authentication (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b).
However, system-generated answers to security questions need to be better presented to the user, by
investigating techniques that could enhance memorability (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b).
Previous work (Ho et al. 2009) found that an increase in fun and enjoyment leads to an enhanced
memorability and consequently an improved learning experience. One could argue that an improved
learning experience provides a high user satisfaction, which was empirically investigated by previous
work on security behaviour (Arachchilage et al. 2016), that it could motivate users to change peoples’
phishing threat avoidance behaviour. Hence, in this paper, we evaluate a serious game that nudges
users’ memorability of answers to security questions with the ultimate goal of bridging the trade-off
between usability (i.e. memorability) and security during fall-back authentication.
We decided to implement a serious game as a mobile app and to primarily focus on the 18-35 age group
because 95% of Australians in this age group own a mobile phone (Poushter 2016), due to its mobility
nature. Hence, in our research, we adapted the popular picture-based "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game
(Google Play 2014). This game asks users to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g. for pictures
in Figure 1a the relating word would be "Walk"). We selected this game because of its use of pictures and
cues, in which, previous psychology research has found to be important to help with memorability
(Paivio et al. 1968). Besides asking users to solve the standard game’s challenges, we adapted this game,
so that it also asks users to solve challenges based on the answers chosen to their security questions
(security questions challenges) (Micallef and Arachchilage 2017a, 2017b).
Since the aim of this work is to understand whether or not the proposed serious game has the potential
of improving the memorability of stronger answers to security questions (in this case system-generated
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answers), in our evaluation we assigned participants to one of two groups. Group 1 selects their own
answers to security questions (i.e. control group). Group 2 uses answers based on a system-generated
profile (i.e. experimental group) (similar to Micallef and Just (2011)). We also want to understand the
short-term impact (in terms of workload and memorability) of using system-generated profiles, when
memorizing answers to security questions, playing a game and then remembering answers to security
questions. Hence, our research contributes to the field of fall-back authentication by answering the
following research questions (RQs):
RQ1: Does the serious game have the potential of helping users remember stronger answers to security
questions?
RQ2: What’s the short-term impact of using a system-generated profile on memorizing answers to
security questions, playing a game and then remembering answers to security questions?
We know to our cost that no-one has evaluated the design of a serious game to nudge users’ memorability
towards stronger answers to security questions based on system-generated profiles. In Section 2, we
describe the background related to our research. In Section 3, we describe the game, security questions
and system-generated profiles that we use in our user evaluation. Afterwards, we describe our user
evaluation (Section 4), present the results of the evaluation (Section 5) and discuss how these results
answer RQ1 and RQ2 (Section 6). Finally, we present the limitations of this research, future work
(Section 7) and main conclusions that could be drawn from this work (Section 8).

2 Related Work
2.1 Security Questions and System-generated Data
Security questions are set-up at account creation. Then, at password recovery, users have to remember
the answers that they provided when setting up the account. Recent studies, conducted using security
questions data collected by Google (Bonneau et al. 2015), found that security questions are neither
usable (i.e. low memorability) nor secure enough to recovery passwords. This means that new
techniques need to be investigated to provide more secure and memorable security questions.
System-generated password schemes were evaluated to be more secure than user-defined passwords
(Shay et al. 2012). However, they were evaluated to be not memorable (Al-Ameen et al. 2015), even when
using natural-language words (Wright et al. 2012). For instance, Wright et al. (2012) evaluated the
usability of three system-generated password schemes and found that these schemes did not have
sufficient memorability rates. Also, Forget et al. (2008) evaluated a hybrid scheme which uses both userselected and system-generated passwords by having a system which randomly adds characters to a userchosen password to improve its' security. This scheme only achieved a memorability of 25% when two
random characters were inserted. These findings further justify the need to evaluate new techniques (see
Section 2.2) to improve users' memorability of system-generated data.

2.2 Memorability and Gamification
Bonneau and Schechter (2014) found that most users can memorize passwords when using tools that
support learning over time. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed a cognitive memory model, in which,
new information is transferred to short-term memory through sensory organs. The short-term memory
holds this new information as mental representations of selected parts of the information. This
information is only passed from short-term to long-term memory when it can be encoded through cueassociation (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968) (e.g. when we see a cat it reminds us of our first cat). This
encoding helps people remember and retrieve the stored information over a long period of time. These
encodings are strengthened through constant rehearsals. Psychology research (Paivio et al. 1968;
Thornton 2001) found that humans are better at remembering images than text (i.e. the picture
superiority effect). The picture superiority effect has also been extensively used in usable security to
research graphical authentication mechanisms (De Angeli et al. 2005; Denning et al. 2011; Stobert and
Biddle 2013; Castellucia et al. 2017). Hence, in our research we use these psychology findings to design
a game that nudges users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions.
Besides the previously described work, in our research we use a game-based learning approach because
previous work in the security field (Arachchilage and Love 2013) has successfully used this approach to
educate users about the susceptibility to phishing attacks, to teach users to be less prone to these types
of security vulnerabilities (Arachchilage et al. 2012, 2014, 2016). Thus, our main contribution to the field
of fall-back authentication is to investigate whether or not the proposed serious game has the potential
of improving users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions.
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3 Serious Game
This section describes the game design, security questions and system-generated profiles used in our
user evaluation.

3.1 Game Design
Using the popular "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game, we create encoding associations between cues and
answers to security questions through the picture-based nature of this game and by adding verbal cues.
The game functions similarly to the "4 Pics 1 Word" mobile game, meaning that the game asks players
to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g. for the pictures in Figure 1a the relating word would
be “Walk"). However, at certain intervals, the game asks players to solve challenges based on answers to
their security questions. These challenges could either be based on users’ own answers to security
questions or on answers based on system-generated profiles. The game provides players with 12 letters
to assist them with solving the challenge (as in the original “4 Pics 1 Word” mobile game). For each given
answer, players are either rewarded or deducted points (10 for standard challenges, 15 for recognition
security questions challenges and 20 for recall security questions challenges – these numbers were
selected to motivate players to solve security question challenges). Points can be used to obtain hints to
help solving more difficult challenges (deduction of 50 points for each hint, as in the original game).

Figure 1: Challenges: a) standard, b) recall, c) recognition.
The Generate-recognize theory (Anderson and Bower 1972) states that recognition (i.e. remembering
contextual information when a focus is provided (Hollingworth 1913)) is easier and faster to perform
than recall (i.e. remembering a specific focus when context is provided (Hollingworth 1913)). Thus, for
security questions challenges, in the proposed game we use both recall and recognition challenges (see
Figure 1b and 1c) because having only recognition challenges would have lowered the security level of
the game, since the answer space would have been very limited. Therefore, the players are provided with
more recognition challenges (i.e. select 1 of 4 pictures) at the beginning, with the purpose of encoding
into long-term memory the associations between cues (pictures) and information (answers to security
questions). Then, as the player gets used to the game and learns the answers the game starts showing
more recall (i.e. provide exact answer to security questions) rather than recognition challenges.
Psychology research (Anderson and Bower 1972) has shown that it is difficult to remember information
spontaneously without having any kind of memory cues. Hence, besides showing the 12 letters we added
a feature that shows verbal cues about each picture. This feature can be enabled by using the points (i.e.
when the game player earns 50 points throughout the game) that are gathered when solving other game
challenges. This feature was added so that players could focus their attention on associating the words
with the corresponding cues (pictures). We hypothesize that this feature should also help to process and
encode the information in memory, to store it in long-term memory (Al-Ameen at al. 2015). To reduce
the vulnerabilities towards potential guessing attacks, our serious game has the following features: (1)
does not show the length of the word that needs to be guessed; (2) does not show the correct answer
when the wrong answer is provided; and (3) does not provide any hints for recognition challenges since
the answer space is already very limited. These features make the game more difficult, but we argue that
they minimize the security vulnerabilities of the game.
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3.2 Security Questions
We used previous research (Rabkin 2008; Bonneau et al. 2010; Micallef and Just 2011; Bonneau et al.
2015) to define the security questions categories listed in Table 1. Names, favourites and places were
selected because they are the most popular types of security questions found on websites (Rabkin 2008;
Bonneau et al. 2010). Numbers were selected because they could potentially be the most secure security
questions (Bonneau et al. 2015). Characteristics were added to make the system-generated data look
similar to a profile (Micallef and Just 2011). To cover a wide range of questions we arbitrary selected 3
questions for each category (see Table 1). During the evaluation we asked participants to select 3 security
questions because Renaud and Just (2010) found that posing 3 or more questions serially would be more
secure, since it is difficult to guess all 3 answers irrespective of how close the attacker is to the victim. In
our studies we do not use freely chosen security questions (e.g. the user defines his own answers to
security questions) with free-form answers because Just and Aspinall (2010) reported serious concerns
over the usability of these security questions (e.g. difficult to precisely remember the given answers).
Type

Security Questions

Names

Mother's maiden name, Father's middle name, Best friends name.

Favourites

Favourite pet, Favourite food, Favourite hobby.

Numbers

Last 6 digits Visa no, Last 6 digits Phone number, Vehicle registration number.

Places

High school city name, College city name, First work city name.

Characteristics

First occupation, Last gained skill, Main Weakness.

Table 1. Security questions.

3.3 System-generated Profiles
Figure 2 shows the system-generated profiles that we used in our user evaluation. We defined these
system-generated profiles using Fake Name Generator (Corban Works 2006). We selected the attributes
of these profiles by combining the attributes that were used by Micallef and Just (2011) to the list of
security questions that we defined in Table 1. We defined a male and a female profile so that we cover
the two most common genders. Since the design of a system-generated profile is not the main focus of
this research, further research needs to be conducted to identify the optimal attributes that are required
for a system-generated profile to be used to answer security questions.

Figure 2: System-generated profiles
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4 User Evaluation
To answer our research questions (RQ1 and RQ2), we conducted a lab evaluation which consisted of
two sessions (Session 1 – participants selected security questions and answers, Session 2 – participants
memorized answers to security questions, played game and remembered answers to security questions).
We used a between subjects design to compare and contrast our two groups of participants. Participants
were randomly split into 2 equal groups. Group 1 participants were provided with a list of security
questions. Then, they were asked to come up with the answers to those security questions by themselves.
Group 2 participants were given 2 system-generated profiles (see Figure 2) and they were asked to
choose one profile. Then, they were asked to choose security questions/answers from the chosen profile.
Prior to starting the evaluation we obtained ethical approval from our University’s Ethics Committee.

4.1 Procedure
Before starting the evaluation we conducted a small pilot study with 4 participants to evaluate the setup.
Since the pilot study did not highlight any problems (we just removed 4 questions from pre-evaluation
questionnaire) we included the 4 pilot participants in the main user evaluation. Session 1 was conducted
separately because we needed time to configure the serious game based on the answers that were
selected by the participants. In Session 1, participants were briefed on the evaluation, were asked to sign
the consent form and selected security questions and answers. Participants also completed a preevaluation questionnaire, consisting of demographic information together with details about
participants’ experience with security questions and mobile phones. After configuring the game, this
always happened on the same day as Session 1, we met with participants to conduct Session 2.
In Session 2, participants were asked to conduct the following three tasks: Task 1 - memorize answers
to security questions; Task 2 - play a game; and Task 3 - remember answers to security questions. All
participants memorized the answers to the security questions within 5 minutes. To understand the
impact of using system-generated profiles on memorizing answers, playing the game and remembering
answers (RQ2), participants completed the standard NASA task load index (NASA/TLX) questionnaire
(Hart & Staveland 1988) after conducting every task (Tasks 1-3). We used the NASA/TLX metrics to
evaluate workload because it is the standard metrics that is used in mobile HCI (Brewster 2002; Micallef
et al. 2016) and usable security (Juang et al. 2012; Sherman et al. 2014) to evaluate mental demand,
temporal demand, physical demand, performance, effort and frustration of using a system. After
memorization, participants conducted an arithmetic distraction exercise (Bateman 2007a) for 5 minutes
(Juang et al., 2012). At this stage participants were handed a mobile device (Samsung Galaxy S4) with
the game described in Section 3 and configured with the answers to the security questions that
participants selected in Session 1. We first went through a test game together with the participants (to
show them how to play the game) and then we told them to play the game on their own.
The game started by picking a random standard challenge from a pool of 7 standard challenges (all
participants experienced the same standard challenges but in a random order). After completing a
standard challenge, the game player was given/deducted points. Afterwards, the challenge was removed
from the pool of available challenges. At this stage the player was presented with a randomly selected
recognition security questions challenge (based on the security answers that they selected prior to
playing the game). The player continued to be presented with alternate standard and recognition
challenges until they completed the 3 recognition security questions challenges. After that, the player
was prompted with alternate standard and recall challenges until all 3 recall security questions
challenges were completed. This is where the game ended. In total, each player completed 7 standard
challenges, 3 recognition and 3 recall security questions challenges.
After playing the game, the participants completed the NASA/TLX to measure the workload of playing
the game. After completing another 5 minutes distraction task (Bateman 2007b) participants were
asked to write down the answers to their security questions to understand the short-term effect of using
the game to remember the answers for both groups (RQ1).

4.2 Participants
We recruited 20 participants (5 females, 15 males) through word of mouth and personal connections.
The mean age was 29 (22-45), med=28. 16 participants were post-graduate students and the rest (4)
were employed full-time. Only 2/20 participants reported that they were not experienced and confident
with using security questions on online websites. All participants (20/20) self-reported that they owned
a smartphone for more than three years.
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5 Results
In this section we present how the results of the user evaluation described in Section 4 answer our
research questions (RQ1 and RQ2). Since we used independent samples, we tested for statistical
differences between our groups (Group 1 and Group 2) using T-Test (for independent samples) when
data was normalized and Mann-Whitney U test when data was not normalized (< 0.05 using ShapiroWilk normality test). We assume that statistically significant differences are achieved when p < 0.05.

5.1 Does the game have the potential to help users remember answers to
security questions?
After playing the game we asked all participants to write down the answers to the security questions that
they selected in Session 1. We wanted to understand whether participants remember them (short-term)
after conducting two arithmetic distraction tasks and playing a game in between. All participants
(20/20) remembered the answers. All participants (10/10) that used their own answers to security
questions (Group 1) reported that their answers were based on their own life experiences. Hence,
although it was highly likely that these participants would remember (short-term) the answers to the
security questions that are based on their own life experiences, it is still interesting to notice that no-one
used fake answers. With regards to Group 2, it is interesting to note that 4/10 participants that answered
security questions based on a system-generated profile failed to solve recall security questions game
challenges. However, despite the game did not provide them with the correct answer (due to security
reasons), they still provided the correct answer when they were asked to write down their answer. These
findings indicate that the proposed serious game has the potentially of helping users which use stronger
answers to security questions to remember their answers, even in the long-term.

5.2 What’s the impact of system-generated profiles on memorizing answers,
playing a game and remembering answers to security questions? (RQ2)
To understand the impact of using system-generated data for answers to security questions we measured
the workload of memorizing answers, playing the game and remembering answers. Workload was
collected using the standard NASA/TLX questionnaire (Hart & Staveland 1988), which measures mental
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, effort, performance, and frustration on a scale of 0 to 100.

Figure 3: Workload for a) Task 1 - Memorizing Answers, b) Task 2- Playing Game and c) Task 3 Remembering Answers for Groups 1 and 2. Significant differences are shown in green dashed boxes.
As shown in Figure 3a, participants evaluated the workload of memorizing answers to security questions
(Task 1), which were based on their own security answers (Group 1) to be low in all measures. This result
is related to the fact that all participants reported that they use answers based on their own life
experiences to answer these questions. Although, for all measures participants that based their answers
on a system-generated profile (Group 2) reported higher workload (see Figure 3a), only mental demand
(t(18)=-3.594, p=0.002), effort (t(18)=-2.939, p=0.009) and frustration (t(18)=-2.726, p=0.014) were
significantly higher than the results obtained for Group 1. This means that memorizing systemgenerated answers for security questions was considered to have a medium workload (closer to low) for
mental demand, effort and frustration while the other measures were considered to be low and similar
to using their own answers to security questions.
Mental demand after the game play activity (Task 2) was evaluated to be significantly higher by
participants that used a system-generated profile to answer security questions (t(18)=-2.685, p=0.015).
All the other measures of the game activity were evaluated similarly by both groups (no significant
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differences (see Figure 3b)). Except for physical demand and frustration which were evaluated to be
low, the other measures (mental demand, temporal demand, performance and effort) were evaluated
to have medium workload. This result might be related to the challenging aspect of the game, since on
average participants failed to solve 2 standard challenges out of 7.
The task of remembering answers to security questions (Task 3) was evaluated to be low for all measures
for both groups (see Figure 3c). However, participants that had to remember answers to security
questions based on a system-generated profile (Group 2) found the mental demand (U=18, p=0.014),
performance (U=24.5, p=0.048) and effort (U=14, p=0.006) to require significantly more workload
than participants that remembered their own answers (Group 1). There were no significant differences
between the groups for the other measures (physical demand, temporal demand and frustration).
These findings imply that despite requiring more effort and mental demand, participants in Group 2
still required a low workload to remember answers to security questions using a system-generated
profile and in the short-term there was not much difference compared to the other group.
We did not find any significant differences in game performance (similar amounts of solved challenges,
used hints and time taken to play the game). These findings suggest that playing the game using
challenges of system-generated answers to security questions did not require much extra effort because
the workload and game performance were mostly similar to using answers to security questions based
on participants own lives. Also, although using system-generated data significantly impacted the
workload of memorizing and remembering answers, the workload was still evaluated to be medium for
memorizing answers (which is a one-time task) and low for remembering answers.

6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how our results could help bridge the trade-off between security and usability
(in terms of memorability (Just and Aspinall 2009)) for security questions.

6.1 Improving memorability through serious games
Previous work has implemented novel graphical authentication schemes (Denning et al. 2011; Stobert
and Biddle 2013; Castellucia et al. 2017) or used mnemonics (Juang et al. 2012) and games to improve
the memorability of passwords (Tao and Adams 2008; Malempati and Mogalla 2011; McLennan et al.
2017). Since the system-generated data that we used in our studies (see Figure 2) is completely different
from the passwords/schemes used by previous work, we cannot conduct any direct memorability
comparisons. However, since the proposed serious game seems to have helped participants who were
using system-generated profiles to remember their answers, even when they failed to solve some of the
recall challenges presented by the game, we argue that from a high-level perspective our memorability
results seem to confirm the effectiveness of using serious games to improve memorability of answers to
security questions. More specifically, our findings seem to indicate that the proposed serious game could
potentially lead to improve the long-term memorability of answers to security questions (this still has to
be evaluated in a longitudinal field study). This improvement in memorability would directly improve
the usability of stronger answers to security questions (Just and Aspinall 2009). Hence, this potential
improvement in memorability of answers to security questions shows that the proposed serious game
(which was designed using memorability concepts (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968)) could eventually help
reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back authentication.

6.2 Impact of using system-generated profiles
When comparing the workload results to other work, we found that the workload (e.g. mental demand,
temporal demand, physical demand, effort, etc.) of memorizing answers to security questions based on
system-generated profiles is slightly higher than when using user-generated free-form gestures
(gestures that allow all fingers to draw a path on an empty screen with requiring a grid) for
authentication (Sherman et al. 2014). Remembering system-generated answers is comparable to using
free-form gestures. When comparing our workload results to a study which assessed password reset
policies at a university (Parkin et al. 2015), we found that using system-generated answers requires less
workload than registering for a password recovery policy and when authenticating to recover passwords.
Hence, our work also reveals that using system-generated profiles to answer security questions did not
have any significant short-term effect on any major aspects of our evaluation or compared to other work
in the area. Therefore, we argue that the use of system-generated data to answers security questions
could play an important role in reducing the vulnerabilities (to social engineering attacks) of our online
accounts (Shay et al. 2012) without requiring much extra effort (in the-short term), when compared to
using our own answers to security questions.
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7 Limitations and Future Work
One of the main limitations of our evaluation is that we only evaluated the short-term memorability of
the game to nudge users’ memorability of stronger answers to security questions. Hence, future studies
need to confirm whether or not our findings could be extended to long-term memorability. Another
limitation is that we primarily focused on the 18-35 age group, since in Australia this is the demographic
that uses mobile phones the most (95%) (Poushter 2016). Although, other research (McLennan et al.
2017) found that serious games in security education are considered to be fun by different populations,
we still plan to investigate different age groups to determine whether our findings also extend to
different populations. We will also conduct a security evaluation of the proposed serious game to
determine the security vulnerabilities that need to be addressed to achieve the required security level.
Afterwards, we will conduct a longitudinal field study to determine how much training is required, so
that users learn the answers to their security questions, when using the proposed serious game.

8 Conclusions
The main outcome of this research is that our participants remembered (short-term) their answers to
security questions (RQ1) after the game play activity (including participants that used system-generated
profiles, see Figure 2). Our work also revealed that using system-generated profiles to answer security
questions did not have any significant short-term effect on playing the game and remembering answers
to security questions, compared to users that used their own answers (RQ2). Thus, the main
contribution of our work is that our findings indicate that the proposed serious game could potentially
lead to improve the users’ long-term memorability of stronger answers to security questions. This
improvement in memorability would directly improve the usability of using strong answers to security
questions (Just and Aspinall 2009). Hence, we strongly believe that the potential improvement in
memorability achieved through the use of a serious game (which uses memorability concepts) could
eventually help reduce the trade-off between usability and security in fall-back authentication.
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